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Abstract
We consider an application to the discrete log problem using completely regular semi-
groups which may provide a more secure symmetric cryptosystem than the classic sys-
tem based on groups. In particular we describe a scheme that would appear, for some
groups, to offer protection to a standard trial multiplication attack. keywords Semi-
group, completely regular, discrete logarithm, cryptography Mathematics Subject
Classification 2010: 11T71, 94A60, 20M10, 20M30
1 Introduction and Preliminaries
We refer the reader to [2] for basic results and terminology in semigroups and in particular
for the necessary background in completely regular semigroups. See also [5] for the some
background in applications of semigroup actions to the discrete log problem.
A semigroup S is called a completely simple semigroup, if S has no proper ideals and if the
natural partial order on the idempotents, given by
e ≤ f if and only if e = ef = fe,
is trivial. It can be shown by Rees’ Theorem ([2, Theorem 3.2.3]) that a completely simple
semigroup is isomorphic to what is commonly referred to as a Rees Matrix Semigroup. A
semigroup S =M[G; I,Λ;P ] is called a Rees Matrix Semigroup over the group G if for sets
I and Λ,
S = I ×G× Λ
and P = (pλi) is a Λ × I matrix, referred to as the sandwich matrix, with entries in the
group G, and where multiplication is given by
(i, g, λ)(j, h, µ) = (i, gpλjh, µ).
It is worth noting that a group G is an example of a completely simple semigroup in which
|I| = |Λ| = 1 and P = (1G)1×1.
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A semigroup S is called completely regular if every element of S belongs to a subgroup of
S. It can be shown (see [2]) that S is completely regular if and only if S is a semilattice of
completely simple semigroups. That is to say, S =
⋃˙
α∈Y Sα where each Sα is a completely
simple semigroup and Y is a semilattice, and where SαSβ ⊆ Sα∧β . We shall denote this
semigroup by S = S[Y ;Sα].
Suppose now that S = S[Y ;Sα] is a completely regular semigroup in which each Sα is a
group. Then S is called a semilattice of groups. It is in fact a strong semilattice of groups
(see [2, Theorem 4.2.1]) in the sense that there are structure maps φαβ : Sα → Sβ for α ≥ β
with the properties
1. (∀α ∈ Y ) φαα = 1Sα ;
2. (∀α, β, γ ∈ Y ) φβγ ◦ φαβ = φαγ ;
3. (∀x ∈ Sα, y ∈ Sβ) xy =
(
φαα∧β(x)
)(
φβα∧β(y)
)
.
Let G = (G, ·) be a group and let p be a fixed element in G. Define a binary operation, ∗,
on G by
x ∗ y = xpy, for x, y ∈ G.
Then it is easy to see that the system (G, ∗, p) is a group, with identity p−1 and where
the inverse of x is given by the element p−1 · x−1 · p−1 in G, and where p−1 and x−1 are
the inverses of p and x in the original group (G, ·). It is also easy to see that the map
(G, ·)→ (G, ∗, p) given by x 7→ xp−1 is a group isomorphism.
Let n be a positive integer and let Zn = {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} be the ring of integers modulo
n. We are interested in the multiplicative structure of Zn and aim to show that Zn, under
multiplication, is a completely regular semigroup. The group of units modulo n will be
denoted by Un. Note that |Un| = φ(n) where φ is Euler’s totient function. We will usually
represent the units in Un by elements from the set of least non-negative residues. So, for
example, if p is prime then Up = {1, . . . , p− 1}.
Let m be a positive integer and let p1, . . . , pm be distinct primes and let I = {1, . . . ,m}. Let
n =
∏
i∈I pi and for any non-empty subset S ⊆ I, let nS =
∏
i∈S pi and denote by S = I \S,
so that n = nSnS . Define
US = {nSx : x ∈ UnS},
where UnS is the group of units modulo nS and let U∅ = {0}.
Proposition 1.1 With the notation described above, for any non-empty subset S ⊆ I, US
is a subgroup of the multiplicative semigroup Zn, and is isomorphic to UnS . Moreover
Zn =
⋃˙
S⊆IUS
is a strong semilattice of groups, S[Y ;US ] in which Y is the boolean algebra P(I).
Proof. It is intuitively clear, and easy to show in any case, that US ∼= (UnS , ∗, nS) ∼= UnS .
Notice that the identity in US is (nS)
−1
, the inverse of nS in UnS . Let S and T be distinct
subsets of I and suppose that y ∈ US ∩ UT . Then
z = nSx = nT y
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for some x ∈ UnS , y ∈ UnT . Given that S and T are distinct, we can assume, without loss of
generality, that there exists i ∈ S such that i 6∈ T . But then pi|z and so pi|y which means
that i ∈ T , a contradiction. Hence US ∩ UT = ∅.
Now, let 0 6= k ∈ Zn and let Sk be the largest subset of I such that for each i ∈ Sk, pi|k.
If Sk = ∅ then k ∈ Un. Otherwise, k = nSkxk for some xk ∈ UnSk and so k ∈ USk .
Consequently Zn =
⋃˙
S⊆IUS .
Suppose then that x ∈ UnS , y ∈ UnT so that z = nSxnT y ∈ USUT . If S ∩ T = ∅ then
S ∪ T = I and so n|nSnT . Hence z ≡ 0 mod n and consequently z ∈ US∩T . Otherwise
notice that
• UnSUnT ⊆ UnS∩T ,
• nSnT = nS∩T nS∩T ,
• nS∩T ∈ UnS ∩ UnT .
Consequently we deduce that USUT ⊆ US∩T and Zn is a (strong) semilattice of groups. The
structure maps (see [2]) are given by φST : US → UT for T ⊆ S ⊆ I
φST (x) = (nT )
−1
x
where (nT )
−1
is the inverse of nT in UnT .
As a special case:
Corollary 1.2 Let p and q be distinct primes and let n = pq. Then the semigroup Zn, of
integers modulo n under multiplication, is a strong semilattice of the four groups, Upq, Up, Uq
and {0}, in which the semilattice Y is the 4-element Boolean algebra
pq
q p
0
and the structure maps are given by
φpqp (x) = q
−1x, φpqp (x) = p
−1x, φp0(x) = 0, φ
q
0(x) = 0,
where p−1 is the inverse of the element p in the group Uq and q−1 is the inverse of the
element q in the group Up.
Proposition 1.3 Let S = S[Y ;Sα] be a semilattice of finite groups Sα, in which Y has
a top element, 1, say. Construct the Rees Matrix semigroup T = M[S; I,Λ;P ] over the
semigroup S where the entries in P are all taken from the group S1. Then T is completely
regular.
Proof. That T is a semigroup is straightforward. Let xα ∈ Sα and let (i, xα, λ) ∈ T .
Then
(i, xα, λ)
n = (i, (xαpλi)
n−1xα, λ).
Since xαpλi ∈ Sα then by letting n − 1 be a multiple of the order of the element xαpλi
in Sα, we see that (i, xα, λ)
n = (i, xα, λ). Hence the monogenic subsemigroup, 〈(i, xα, λ)〉,
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generated by (i, xα, λ), is actually a cyclic group and so every element of T lies in a subgroup
of T and T is completely regular.
In fact, if φ1α : S1 → Sα is the structure map and if we denote by Pα the matrix obtained
from P by applying this structure map to each element of P , then it is reasonably clear that
T = S[Y ;M[Sα; I,Λ;Pα]].
Corollary 1.4 Let n be a product of distinct primes. The semigroup T = M[Zn; I,Λ;P ]
where the entries in P are taken from Un is a completely regular semigroup.
In the classic discrete log cipher, it is normal to view the cryptosystem as a group acting
freely on another group by exponentiation. In more detail, let p be a prime and let G = Up−1,
the group of units of the ring Zp−1 and let X = Up the group of units of Zp. An algebraic
description of the classic discrete log cipher involves defining a free action of G on X,
G×X → X, by (m,x) 7→ xm. By Fermat’s little theorem, since x is a unit modulo p, then
xp−1 ≡ 1 mod p and since m is coprime to p− 1 then there is a positive integer k such that
mk ≡ 1 mod p − 1. Hence xmk ≡ x mod p and so xmk = x in X. Consequently k is the
‘decrypt’ key for the ‘encrypt’ key m. In practice, of course we can use Zp instead of X as
only 0 ∈ Zp \X and 0m = 0 in Zp. Notice that Zp is a completely regular semigroup being
the union of the two groups Up and {0}.
Now let p and q be distinct primes and let n = pq. The RSA cipher can be described
algebraically in a similar way to the classic discrete log cipher, by using Euler’s Theorem
rather than Fermat’s Little Theorem. This says that if x ∈ Un, the group of units modulo
n, then xφ(n) ≡ 1 mod n, where φ is Euler’s totient function. The RSA cipher is then a
free action of Uφ(n) on Un given by (m,x) 7→ xm. By the Euclidean Algorithm, we deduce
that there exists a positive integer k such that km ≡ 1 mod φ(n) and so xmk = x in Un.
However, we can easily extend the action of Uφ(n) to Zn as follows. If km ≡ 1 mod φ(n)
then there exists l ∈ Z such that km = 1 + lφ(n) = 1 + l(p− 1)(q− 1). Hence if x ∈ Zn \ {0}
then
xkm = x1+lφ(n) = x1+l(p−1)(q−1) ≡ x mod p.
In a similar way xkm ≡ 1 mod q and so xkm ≡ x mod n by the Chinese remainder theorem.
Consequently, from Corollary 1.2, we can view the RSA cipher as an action of the group
Uφ(n) on the completely regular semigroup
Zn ∼= Upq
⋃˙
Uq
⋃˙
Up
⋃˙
{0}.
More generally, let n be a positive integer and let X be a finite semigroup such that G = Un,
the group of units of the ring Zn, acts freely on X by exponentiation. Then the action
G×X → X given by (m,x) 7→ xm is the basis of a cryptosystem, if there exists k ∈ G such
that xmk = x. Consequently, 〈x〉, the monogenic subsemigroup generated by x, is in fact a
cyclic group, and so X is a completely regular semigroup.
We note at this point however, that in [1] the authors show that the discrete log problem
over a semigroup can be reduced, in polynomial time, to the discrete log problem over
a subgroup of the semigroup. Not withstanding this, we describe a scheme involving a
completely regular semigroup (in fact a completely simple one) which, by hiding part of
the information relating to the semigroup multiplication, seems to exclude the possibility of
computing this polynomial reduction. In addition, the scheme seems to offer some protection
against a standard trial multiplication attack.
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2 Completely Simple Cryptosystems
Suppose now that S is a completely simple semigroup, considered as a Rees matrix semigroup
M[G; I,Λ;P ] and suppose also that G is finite, of order r so that gr = 1 for all g ∈ G. Define
an action of Ur, the group of units in Zr, on S by n · x = xn, so that if x = (i, g, λ) then
n · x = (i, (gpλi)n−1g, λ). Notice that |Ur| = φ(r).
Suppose now that n ∈ Ur so that n is coprime to r, and hence there exists m ∈ Ur such
that mn ≡ 1 mod r. Then
xmn = (i, (gpλi)
mn−1g, λ) = (i, (gpλi)mnp−1λi , λ) = (i, (gpλi)p
−1
λi , λ) = (i, g, λ) = x.
Consequently if we know n, xn and P , then we can compute xmn and so recover x. We can
in fact compute xmn in an efficient manner, as we can deduce the values of i and λ from xn
and so we can deduce the value of pλi. Then
(gpλi)
mn−1g = (gpλi)mnp−1λi =
((
(gpλi)
n−1g
)
pλi
)m
p−1λi .
The extra work involved over the classic group based scheme, involves two extra multiplica-
tions (by pλi and p
−1
λi ) together with the computation of p
−1
λi .
Suppose now we know x, xn and G. Can we compute n and therefore solve the discrete
log problem over S? If we also know P then we know pλi and so (gpλi)
n. Consequently,
the discrete log problem in this case is equivalent to that in the classic discrete log problem
over the group G and we are no better off using the completely simple semigroup rather
than a group. Suppose however that P is kept secret and that it is hard to deduce the
value of pλi from that of i and λ. We know (gpλi)
n−1g and we know g and hence we can
compute (gpλi)
n−1 but we don’t know pλi and so can’t obviously recover the classic discrete
log problem from this. According to [1], the discrete log problem over a semigroup, can be
reduced, in polynomial time, to the classic discrete log problem in a subgroup of S, namely
the kernel of the element x. However this assumes that we can compute with the semigroup
S and in order to do that with a Rees Matrix Semigroup, we would require knowledge of
the sandwich matrix P . Consequently we must include the matrix P as part of our secret
key.
In this application of Rees matrix semigroups, the sets I and Λ are being used as index sets
to point at the value pλi ∈ P , and as such we clearly don’t require both of these indices. Let
us therefore assume, without loss of generality, that |Λ| = 1 so that S = I ×G,P = (pi)i∈I
with multiplication given by (i, g)(j, h) = (i, gpjh) and so (i, g)
n = (gpi)
n−1g. We will also
assume from now on that G is abelian.
2.1 Chosen plaintext attacks
Although we keep the values of P secret, if the size of I is small then we can consider the
following chosen plaintext attack based on the existence of an oracle for solving the classic
discrete log problem over the group G. Suppose that |I| = m and let g1, . . . , gm+1 be distinct
elements of G. Suppose also that we encrypt the values (i, gi) as (i, g
n
i p
n−1
i ). By the pigeon
hole principle there exists i 6= j such that pi = pj and hence
(gni p
n−1
i )(g
n
j p
n−1
j )
−1 = (gig−1j )
n.
Consequently we can reduce the semigroup discrete log problem over S to the group discrete
log problem over G. However, we do not know the values of i and j and so have to compute
this quantity for each pair 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m + 1, and there are
(
m+ 1
2
)
= O(m2) of these. If
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m is relatively small, then running m2 versions of the group oracle in parallel is probably
feasible and consequently we need to ensure that m is sufficiently large, say comparable to
the size of the group G.
This clearly imposes some issues with storing the matrix P . If P is part of the secret key
then a large size for I means that, in practical terms, we must compute the entries pi ∈ P ,
dynamically.
In addition, there is another potential chosen plaintext attack. Technically the value of pi is
only dependant on i and not on g. This may cause a problem, as if we could encrypt the data
(i, g) and (i, g−1) then we would obtain the values (i, (gpi)n−1g) and (i, (g−1pi)n−1g−1). If,
as we are assuming, G is abelian, then we can calculate (pn−1i )
2 and hence possibly pn−1i .
Consequently we can deduce the value of gn and so again reduce the semigroup discrete log
problem to the corresponding group discrete log problem. We could avert this problem if
the value of i was chosen in a random fashion.
2.2 The Proposed Completely Simple Scheme
Alice wants to sent Bob a secret message. Let G be a finite (abelian) group and let I = G.
Let n ∈ U|G|, the group of units mod |G|, and s ∈ I be two secret keys known only to Alice
and Bob. Suppose also that f : I×I → G is a function, perhaps based on a cryptographically
secure hash, whose output is uniformly distributed. We encrypt g ∈ G as follows: choose a
random value i ∈ I and let pi = f(i, s). Clearly f must have the property that it is difficult
to compute f(i, s) from the value of i alone. In addition it should be hard to calculate s
given f(i, s) and i. For example the function f(i, j) = H(i⊕ j) where H is a suitable hash
and where i⊕ j is the bitwise xor of i and j might suffice. Alice computes (i, (gpi)n−1g) as
her encrypted value of g to send to Bob. Bob calculates pi = f(i, s) and m ∈ U|G| such that
mn ≡ 1 mod |G| and then computes
g =
((
(gpi)
n−1g
)
pi
)m
p−1i .
However, as we shall see in Section 2.4 below, an attacker can’t easily compute (n, pi) by
trial multiplication attack alone, and as long as pi is hard to deduce from the value of i, and
I is large then the two chosen plaintext attacks detailed above would appear to be infeasible.
One other possible chosen plaintext attack comes to mind. Suppose we encrypt the value
g twice. The first time we obtain the encrypted value (i, (gpi)
n−1g) = (i, gnpn−1i ) and
the second time the value (j, (gpj)
n−1g) = (j, gnpn−1j ). We can then deduce the value of
(pip
−1
j )
n−1, but as we know neither n nor pip−1j then it is hard to see what advantage we
have gained. In fact even if we could deduce the value of n, perhaps using a different attack
or some oracle, we would still need to factorise pip
−1
j to deduce that values of pi and pj .
But in addition, this still wouldn’t allow us to deduce the value of the secret key s unless
the function f is cryptographically insecure.
2.3 Alternative viewpoints
We can view this completely simple cryptosystem in two alternative ways. First, let G =
(G, ·) be a group and let p be a fixed element inG. In the isomorphic group (G, ∗, p) described
above, the element xn is represented by the element (xp)n−1x in (G, ·). Our cryptosystem
then becomes, in effect, a classic discrete log cryptosystem over the group (G, ∗, p), where
p is chosen in the manner outlined above. However, lack of knowledge of the parameter p
prohibits us from computing within this group.
Alternatively, letting G be a group and p a fixed element of G, we can view the bijection
Vp : G→ G, g 7→ gp as a translation or shift function in which the value of p is changed for
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each value of g. If we let the classic discrete log be represented by the bijection Dn : G→ G,
g 7→ gn then our completely simple cryptosystem is equivalent to the bijection
V −1p DnVp : G→ G, g 7→ (gp)n−1g.
In other words it is a conjugate of a classic discrete log system by a simple shift, the changing
of the value of the shift for each block, reminding us of the Vigene`re cipher, albeit with an
‘infinitely’ long key.
2.4 Brute Force Attack
For the classic discrete log cipher over a group G, to compute n from g and gn requires, at
worst, φ(|G|) computations. For a careful choice of G this is O(|G|). Using a completely sim-
ple semigroup is significantly more expensive as not only are there more trial multiplications
to consider, but the discrete log problem over S seems to offer some protection to a stan-
dard trial multiplication attack. To see this, suppose we are given (i, g) and (i, (gpi)
n−1g).
Computing n using a trial multiplication attack would consists of computing (gq)
m−1
g for
1 ≤ m ≤ φ(|G|) and q ∈ G in order to find the relevant pair with (m, q) = (n, pi). In
principle there are a maximum of φ(|G|)|G| such computations, which is O(|G|2). However,
notice that if gcd(m − 1, |G|) = 1 then there exists k such that k(m − 1) ≡ 1 mod |G| and
so for any x ∈ G, xk(m−1) = x. Consequently
(gpi)
n−1g =
(
g
(
(pig)
k(n−1)−1
pi
))m−1
g
and so there is no unique pair (m, q) = (n, pi) that can be computed by a simple trial
multiplication attack alone. Notice however that we also require gcd(m, |G|) = 1. If |G| is
even then of course this is impossible and so a slightly different approach is necessary. In
this case, it necessary follows that n must be odd and so we let m be an odd integer such
that gcd((m− 1)/2, |G|) = 1. If both n and m are odd then (gpi)n−1 = y2 for y ∈ G and so
if we let k be such that k(m− 1)/2 ≡ 1 mod |G| then yk(m−1)/2 = y and hence
(gpi)
n−1g =
(
g
(
g−1yk
))m−1
g.
Consequently, not only are there, potentially, an order of magnitude more trial multiplica-
tions to perform, there are potentially many solutions (m, q) to the equation
(gpi)
n−1g = (gq)m−1g. (1)
It seems clear therefore that some other information must be gained and used in order to
execute a successful trial multiplication attack. In addition, even if we could determine the
values of n and pi, we would still need to be able to invert the function f : I × I → G in
order to determine the value of the secret s.
We shall consider the number of solutions to (1) in section 3 below.
In Figure 1 below, we demonstrate the effects of group based encryption against semigroup
based encryption. An image file, Figure 1(a), with an 8-bit colour depth field has been en-
crypted using 8-bit blocks, with a value of p = 257, e = 75. The first encryption, Figure 1(b),
uses a standard group based encryption x 7→ xe mod p whilst the second, Figure 1(c), uses
a completely simple based scheme x 7→ (xpi)e−1x with secret key s = 201 and the function
f based on the SHA512 hash function. Of course, such values of the parameters are unre-
alistically small, and we are not advocating using these cryptosystems as block ciphers as
such, but it helps to demonstrate the extra diffusion incorporated in the ciphertext by the
inclusion of the random data inherent in the value of pi.
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(a) no encryption (b) group based cipher (c) semigroup based cipher
Figure 1: discrete log encryption on similar blocks
2.5 Completely Regular RSA cipher
The obvious candidate for the group G would be the group of units Up, for p a large prime,
or perhaps the group associated with a suitable Elliptic Curve. However, if n = pq with p
and q large distinct primes, then Corollary 1.4 implies that we can replace G by Zn provided
we can guarantee that the entries pi belong to Un. We could then modify the RSA cipher
in the following way.
Let n = pq be the product of two distinct primes and let e and f be Bob’s public and private
exponents for an RSA cipher. To send a message g to Bob, Alice chooses a random element
pi ∈ Un and, within Zn, computes the pair
(pei , (gpi)
e−1g).
Bob first recovers pi = p
ef
i and then g =
((
(gpi)
e−1
g
)
pi
)f
.
The security of this system is of course no better than that of the standard RSA cipher
and has the disadvantage of resulting in twice the length of ciphertext, but it has the
slight advantage of adding more diffusion by being able to encrypt two identical, non-zero,
plaintext blocks into different ciphertext blocks, whilst retaining the asymmetric nature of
the cryptosystem.
3 Imitations and mimics
We have seen that brute force attacks on the completely simple system suffer from a lack of
unique solutions, (m, q), to the equation
(gpi)
n−1g = (gq)m−1g.
In this section we show that, potentially, many such solutions exist. We initially consider a
slightly more general case.
Let G be a finite group and let g, h, p, q ∈ G,n,m ∈ U|G|. We shall say that the triple
(m,h, q) imitates the triple (n, g, p) if the element hm of the group (G, ∗, q) coincides with
the element gn of the group (G, ∗, p). In other words if
(hq)
m−1
h = (gp)
n−1
g.
We wish to consider how many imitations there may be for a particular triple (n, g, p). We
shall say that h mimics g if (m,h, q) imitates (n, g, p) for some q ∈ G and some m ∈ U|G|.
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Theorem 3.1 Let G be a finite abelian group.
1. If |G| is odd then h mimics g for every h, g ∈ G.
2. If |G| is even then h mimics g if and only if h = gz2 for some z ∈ G.
Proof. Suppose that g, p ∈ G,n ∈ U|G|, let x = (gp)n−1g and let h ∈ G.
1. Let k ∈ U|G| be such that k−1 ∈ U|G| and suppose that m and l are integers such that
mk ≡ 1 mod |G|, l(k − 1) ≡ 1 mod |G| (see Theorem 3.4 below for the justification
that such k exist). Define q =
(
h(x−1)k
)l
. Then (hq)m−1h = x. To see this, notice
that
hq = hl+1(x−1)kl = hkl(x−1)kl = (hk−1)kl.
Hence
(hq)m−1h = (hx−1)klm−klh = (hx−1)l(1−k)h = (hx−1)−1h = x.
2. Let k ∈ U|G| be such that (k− 1)/2 ∈ U|G| and suppose now that m and l are integers
such that mk ≡ 1 mod |G|, l(k − 1)/2 ≡ 1 mod |G| (see Theorem 3.14 below for the
justification that such k exist). Let h = gy2 for y ∈ G. Then n and k are both odd
and so
x−kh = x−(k−1)x−1h = x−(k−1)x−1gy2 = x1−k(gp)1−ny2 = z2
for some z ∈ G. Now let q = zl so that
qk−1 = (zl)k−1 = (z2)l(k−1)/2 = z2 = x−kh,
and then
hq = (xq)k.
Hence
(hq)m−1h = (xq)km−kh = (xq)1−kh = x1−kh−1xkh = x.
Conversely, if x = (hq)m−1h for some h, q ∈ G,m ∈ U|G| then xq = (hq)m and so
(xq)k = hq, where k is an integer such that km ≡ 1 mod |G|. Hence h = xkqk−1 =
g(gq)k−1
(
(gp)k
)n−1
, and since k − 1 and n− 1 are both even, the result follows.
By [4, Theorem 2.11], the number of squares in a finite group, G, of even order, denoted
G2, satisfies 1 ≤ G2 ≤ |G| − b√|G|c. In the case of a group of order 2q with q odd then
G2 = |G|/2 [4, Corollary 2.3]. So, depending on the prime factorisation of |G|, and regardless
of whether |G| is odd or even, there are potentially a large number of mimics of g ∈ G.
We now consider when g mimics g. Put another way, given a finite group G of order n and
a fixed element y ∈ G, we wish to find the number of units m in Zn, with the property that
the equation
xm−1 = y
has a solution in G.
This appears to be a rather difficult problem to find an exact solution for and so we shall
aim at finding a lower bound on the number of such units m. If m− 1 is also a unit in Zn
with inverse k, then x = yk is a solution. Clearly, in this case, n has to be odd. On the
other hand, if n is even then m has to be odd and so, if there is a solution, then y = h2 for
some h ∈ G. In this case, suppose that (m− 1)/2 is also a unit in Zn with inverse k. Then
x = hk is a solution.
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We consider both these cases separately, and show that the number of such imitations is
potentially large.
First, let n be an odd positive integer greater than 1. We need to find the number of values
of m such that gcd(m,n) = 1 and gcd(m− 1, n) = 1 and 1 ≤ m ≤ n− 1. Let us denote this
value by S(n).
Theorem 3.2 Let p be an odd prime and let e be a positive integer. Then S(pe) = pe(1−
2/p).
Proof. We need to find those m in {1, . . . , pe} that are neither congruent to 0 nor 1 mod
p. There are pe−1 elements in the set {1, . . . , pe} that are congruent to 0 mod p and pe−1
that are congruent to 1 mod p. Hence S(pe) = pe − 2pe−1 = pe(1− 2/p).
Theorem 3.3 The function S is multiplicative in the sense that if m and n are coprime
and odd then S(m)S(n) = S(mn).
Proof. The proof is identical to that for Euler’s function φ(n) (see, for example, [3]).
The following is then obvious.
Theorem 3.4 Let n = pe11 . . . p
ek
k where pi > 2 are distinct primes and integers ei ≥ 1.
Then
S(n) = n
∏
1≤i≤k
(
1− 2
pi
)
.
Notice that the formula is accurate even when n is even. The function S is often referred to
as Schemmel’s totient function (See [6] for more detail). Recall that
φ(n) = n
∏
1≤i≤k
(
1− 1
pi
)
.
Suppose now that n is even and we wish to count the number of odd values of m such that
gcd(m,n) = 1 and gcd((m− 1)/2, n) = 1. Denote this value by T (n). First,
Theorem 3.5 Let e > 1 be an integer. Then T (2) = 0 and
T (2e) = 2e − 3× 2e−2 = 2e−2.
Proof. If e > 1 then we need to count the odd integers 1 ≤ m ≤ 2e such that m 6≡
0 mod 2 and (m − 1)/2 6≡ 0 mod 2. We count the number of terms that don’t satisfy this
condition and subtract it from 2e. Hence we count those values of m such that
(m ≡ 0 mod 2) ∨ (m ≡ 1 mod 4).
There are 2e−1 that satisfy the first condition and 2e−1/2 that satisfy the second. Hence
the result.
Theorem 3.6 Let n be an odd integer. Then
T (22n) = S(n).
10
Proof. To compute T (4n) we need to remove from the set of residues {1, . . . , 4n} numbers
m of the form
1. m = 2x;
2. m = xp where p|n, p > 1 and x is odd;
3. m = 1 + 2xp where p|n, p > 1;
4. m = 1 + 4x where gcd(x, n) = 1, or m = 1.
Let 1 ≤ a ≤ 2n. Notice that a satisfies (2) or (3) if and only if a + 2n does so as well. If
a does not satisfy (2) or (3), and if a = 1 + 4x with gcd(x, n) = 1 then a + 2n = 3 + 4y,
while if a = 3 + 4y then a + 2n = 1 + 4x with gcd(x, n) = 1. Consequently, to compute
T (4n) we can remove all the even numbers, all the odd numbers greater than 2n and those
odd numbers less than 2n that satisfy (2) or (3). So the only numbers left are those odd
numbers less than 2n that do not satisfy (2) or (3).
We claim that the set of numbers left over has cardinality S(n). Consider then the numbers
{1, . . . , n, n+ 1, . . . , 2n} and notice that to compute S(n) we identify from {1, . . . , n} those
numbers m such that both m and m − 1 are coprime to n. But then m + n also has this
property in the set {n + 1, . . . , 2n} but with a different parity. Hence S(n) corresponds to
the number of odd numbers in the list {1, . . . , 2n} that do not satisfy (2) or (3), as required.
Theorem 3.7 Let n be an odd integer and let e > 2. Then
T (2en) = 2T (2e−1n) = 2e−2T (4n) = 2e−2S(n).
Proof. Partition the set {1, . . . , 8n} into the 2 subsets {1, . . . , 4n} and {1 + 4n, . . . , 8n}.
For each element in the first subset that contributes to T (8n), the element x+4n in the second
subset also contributes to T (8n). The converse is clearly true as well. Hence T (8n) = 2T (4n),
and the result will now follow by induction on e.
Recall some basic binomial series. Let k be a positive integer and define
k′ = k − 1 + (−1)
k
2
, k′′ = k − 1− (−1)
k
2
.
Then
3k − 1
2
=
(
k
1
)
+ 2
(
k
2
)
+ . . .+ 2k−1
(
k
k
)
2k = 1 +
(
k
1
)
+
(
k
2
)
+ . . .+
(
k
k
)
2k−1 =
(
k
1
)
+
(
k
3
)
+ . . .+
(
k
k′
)
=
(
k
0
)
+
(
k
2
)
+ . . .+
(
k
k′′
)
The final case concerns integers of the form 2n for n an odd positive integer. The reader
may wish to have a quick look at the strategy of the proof of Theorem 3.11 below, before
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reading further. Let n be an odd positive integer and let p > 1 be an odd divisor of n.
Define
Dp = {m|1 ≤ m ≤ 2n, 4|(m− 1) and p|m},
Ep = {m|1 ≤ m ≤ 2n, 4|(m− 1) and p|(m− 1)},
Fp = Dp ∪ Ep.
Lemma 3.8 If p > 1 is an odd divisor of n then
|Ep| = n− p
2p
, |Dp| = n± p
2p
and hence
|Fp| = n
p
or |Fp| = n
p
− 1.
Proof. Let n > 1 be odd and let p > 1 be an odd divisor of n.
1. Suppose that 1 + 4x = 1 + py ≤ 2n for positive integers x and y. Then y ≤ (2n− 1)/p
is congruent to 0 mod 4 and so there are (2n−2p)/4p = (n−p)/2p different candidates
for y. Hence |Ep| = (n− p)/2p.
2. Now suppose that 1 + 4x = py ≤ 2n for positive integers x and y. Then py ≤ 2n and
py is congruent to 1 mod 4. Suppose that p ≡ 1 mod (4). Then the general solution
to the equation 1 + 4x = py is 1 + 4(x0 + pt) = p(1 + 4t) where p = 1 + 4x0 and t ∈ Z.
So 1 + 4t ≤ (2n− p)/p and hence t ≤ (2n− 2p)/4p = (n− p)/2p. Therefore there are
(n+ p)/2p solutions in this case.
On the other hand, if p ≡ 3 mod (4) then the general solution is 1+4(x0+pt) = p(3+4t)
where 3p = 1 + 4x0 and so 4t ≤ 2n/p− 6 and there are (n− 3p)/2p+ 1 = (n− p)/2p
solutions in this case.
Hence |Dp| = (n± p)/2p.
Consequently for each p there are either n/p or n/p−1 multiples of 4 that satisfy the relevant
condition.
Notice that if p > 1 and q > 1 are distinct odd divisors of n that are coprime then Dpq =
Dp ∩Dq and Epq = Ep ∩ Eq.
Lemma 3.9 Let p > 1 and q > 1 be distinct odd divisors of n. Then
2n
pq
− 2 ≤ |Fp ∩ Fq| ≤ 2n
pq
+ 1.
Proof. Suppose that p > 1 and q > 1 are distinct odd divisors of n which are coprime.
There are 4 possibilities
1. 1 + 4z = px = qy ≤ 2n for suitable x, y, z ∈ N. Then 1 + 4z ∈ Dpq and so
|Dp ∩Dq| = |Dpq| = n± pq
2pq
.
2. 1 + 4z = 1 + px = 1 + qy ≤ 2n. Then 1 + 4z ∈ Epq and so
|Ep ∩ Eq| = |Epq| = n− pq
2pq
.
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3. 1 + 4x = 1 + py = qz ≤ 2n. From above the solutions to 1 + 4x = 1 + py ≤ 2n are
x = tp for 1 ≤ t ≤ (n− p)/2p.
We therefore need to solve 1 + 4pt = qz for 1 ≤ t ≤ (n− p)/2p. If t0, z0 is the smallest
solution then the general solution is
1 + 4pt0 + 4pqs = qz0 + 4pqs
for s ∈ Z. This means that t0 ≤ q and so the interval [1, (n− p)/2p] can be split into
(n−pq)/2pq ‘blocks’ of q consecutive integers with (n−p)/2p−(n−pq)/2p = (q−1)/2
integers left over. Each block of q integers contains exactly 1 solution and so there are
either (n− pq)/2pq or (n− pq)/2pq + 1 = (n+ pq)/2pq solutions. Hence
|Ep ∩Dq| = n± pq
2pq
.
4. 1+4x = 1+ qy = pz ≤ 2n. By symmetry there are either (n−pq)/2pq or (n+pq)/2pq
solutions. Hence
|Dp ∩ Eq| = n± pq
2pq
.
The result then follows.
Lemma 3.10 Let p1, . . . , pk be k ≥ 2 distinct odd divisors of n. Then
−2k−1 + 2
k−1n
p1 . . . pk
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
k⋂
i=1
Fpi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2k−1 − 1 + 2k−1np1 . . . pk .
Proof. Let r = p1 . . . pk. Notice that
⋂k
i=1 Fpi =
⋂k
i=1 (Dpi ∪ Epi). Hence
k⋂
i=1
Fpi = Dr ∪ Er ∪
⋃
p,q
(Dp ∩ Eq)
where p and q run through all products of fewer than k of the terms pi, such that all k terms
are used exactly once. From the previous lemma,
|Dp ∩ Eq| = n± r
2r
and
|Er| = n− r
2r
, |Dr| = n± r
2r
.
Hence
2k
2
(n
r
− 1
)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
k⋂
i=1
Fpi
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2k − 22 (nr + 1)+ nr .
Now suppose that n has k distinct odd prime factors p1, . . . , pk. Since there are (2n−2)/4 =
(n − 1)/2 values congruent to 1 mod 4, and excluding 1, in the set {1, . . . , 2n}, then there
are
n− 1
2
−
∣∣∣∣∣
k⋃
i=1
Fpi
∣∣∣∣∣
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values m, excluding 1, that are congruent to 1 mod 4 but such that neither m nor m − 1
has a factor in common with n. Using the Inclusion-Exclusion principle we see that this is
bounded above by
n− 1
2
−
∑
i
(
n
pi
− 1
)
+
∑
i 6=j
(
2n
pipj
+ 1
)
− . . .
which simplifies to
−1
2
+
n
2
k∏
i=1
(
1− 2
pi
)
+ k + (21 − 1)
(
k
2
)
+ 22
(
k
3
)
+ (23 − 1)
(
k
4
)
+ . . .
So the upper bound is
1
2
(S(n)− 1) + k + 21
(
k
2
)
+ 22
(
k
3
)
+ 23
(
k
4
)
+ . . .−
(
k
2
)
−
(
k
4
)
− . . .
or
1
2
(S(n)− 1) + 1
2
3k − 1
2
− 1
2
(
2k − 2) = 1
2
(
S(n) + 3k − 2k) .
The lower bound is
n− 1
2
−
∑
i
(
n
pi
)
+
∑
i 6=j
(
2n
pipj
− 2
)
− . . .
which simplifies to
1
2
(S(n)− 1)− 1
2
(
22
(
k
2
)
+ 23
(
k
3
)
+ 24
(
k
4
)
+ . . .
)
+
(
k
3
)
+
(
k
5
)
+ . . .
or
1
2
(S(n)− 1)− 1
2
(
3k − 2k − 1)+ 1
2
(
2k − 2k) = 1
2
(
S(n)− (3k − 2k)) .
Theorem 3.11 Let n > 1 be an odd integer with k distinct prime divisors. Then∣∣∣∣T (2n)− S(n)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3k − 2k + 12 .
If n is prime, then T (2n) = (n − 3)/2 = (S(n) − 1)/2 when n ≡ 3 mod (4) and T (2n) =
(n− 1)/2 = (S(n) + 1)/2 when n ≡ 1 mod (4).
Proof. To compute T (2n) we need to remove from the set of residues R = {1, . . . , 2n}
numbers m of the form
1. m = 2x;
2. m = xp where p|n, p > 1 and x is odd;
3. m = 1 + 2xp where p|n, p > 1;
4. m = 1 + 4x where gcd(x, n) = 1, or m = 1.
Partition the set R into n disjoint subsets Ri = {i, n + i} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Identify those
sets Rj for which, either j = 1, gcd(j, n) 6= 1 or gcd(j − 1, n) 6= 1. There are n − S(n)
such subsets. If j is odd then j satisfies either (2) or (3). If j is even then n + j satisfies
either (2) or (3). Hence all of the elements in the Rj satisfy either (1), (2) or (3) and should
be removed. For the subsets Rk that are left, half of the elements are even and the other
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half are odd and do not satisfy (1), (2) or (3). There are then S(n) such odd terms, some
of which may satisfy (4) (notice that we have already removed m = 1). From above, the
number of these S(n) terms satisfying (4) lies in the range[
1
2
(
S(n)− (3k − 2k)) , 1
2
(
S(n) + 3k − 2k)]
and so T (n) lies in the range[
1
2
(
S(n)− (3k − 2k)) , 1
2
(
S(n) + 3k − 2k)] .
The final part follows from Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 3.8.
Notice that the definition of T (n) makes sense even when n is odd.
Theorem 3.12 Let p be an odd prime and e ≥ 1 an integer. Then
T (pe) = (pe − 2pe−1 − 1)/2 = p
e
2
(
1− 2
p
− 1
pe
)
=
S(pe)− 1
2
.
Proof. We need to count the odd integers 1 ≤ m ≤ pe such that m 6≡ 0 mod p and
(m − 1)/2 6≡ 0 mod p. As before, we count the number of terms that don’t satisfy this
condition and subtract it from pe. The negation of the condition is
(m ≡ 0 mod p) ∨ (m ≡ 1 mod 2p) ∨ (m ≡ 0 mod 2).
There are pe−1 elements that satisfies the first of these, (pe−1 + 1)/2 that satisfy the second
and (pe − 1)/2 that satisfy the third. However there are (pe−1 − 1)/2 that satisfy both the
first and third and so the number we require is
pe − pe−1 − p
e−1 + 1
2
− p
e − 1
2
+
pe−1 − 1
2
=
pe − 2pe−1 − 1
2
.
Using techniques similar to that in Theorem 3.11, it is possible to prove the following, the
details of which are omitted.
Theorem 3.13 Let n be an odd integer with k distinct prime divisors. Then∣∣∣∣T (n)− S(n)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3k − 2k+1 + 12 .
To summarise, if we let S(1) = 1, and if n = 2em for e ≥ 0 and m odd and if k is the number
of prime factors of m, then
Theorem 3.14 1. For e ≥ 2
T (n) = 2e−2S(m).
2. For e = 1 ∣∣∣∣T (n)− S(m)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3k − 2k + 12 ;
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(a) if e = 1 and m ≡ 3 mod 4 is prime
T (n) =
S(m)− 1
2
=
m− 3
2
,
(b) if e = 1 and m ≡ 1 mod 4 is prime
T (n) =
S(m)− 1
2
+ 1 =
m− 1
2
.
3. For e = 0 ∣∣∣∣T (n)− S(m)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3k − 2k+1 + 12 ;
(a) When e = 0 and k = 1,
T (n) =
S(n)− 1
2
.
4 Summary
Using a completely simple semigroup as outlined in Section 2.2 above, to form a discrete log
cryptosystem would appear to offer a more secure encryption method than the corresponding
system based on groups alone. In addition, as outlined in Sections 2.4 and 3, there would
appear to be a certain level of protection from a brute force attack. In particular, for a
completely simple cryptosystem based on Zp with secret exponent n, and where p is a large
prime with the property that p − 1 = 2q with q a large prime, then there are at least,
(q − 3)/2 = (p− 7)/4 imitations (m, g, q) for the triple (n, g, p). So solving the discrete log
problem by trial multiplication alone would seem to be infeasible.
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